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cial power, the national judges, who to secure their impartiality, are to be made independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states go beyond their limits, if they make a law which is a usurpation upon the federal government the law is void; and upright, independent judges will declare it to be so. Still, however, if the United States and the individual states will quarrel, if they want to fight, they may do it, and no frame of government can possibly prevent it. . . .

Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No man pretends the contrary: we all see and feel this necessity. The only question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? There is no other possible alternative. Where will those who oppose a coercion of law come out? Where will they end? A necessary consequence of their principles is a war of the states one against the other. I am for coercion by law—that coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent state, it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.

But this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union. All men will see the reasonableness of this; they will acquiesce, and say, Let the guilty suffer.<sup>31</sup>

But it is unnecessary to consider the matter further, inasmuch as without coercion by force of any kind, West Virginia has already satisfied the judgment rendered against it by the Supreme Court in favor of Virginia. At the request of Virginia, all proceedings pending in the Supreme Court, including the question of coercion, have been dismissed.

Should we, however, be wrong in our views about *injunction* and *mandamus*, it would not militate against the views we have expressed in the matter of *coercing* a State. In our letter of April 15th, to which you replied, we said:

Our conception of the sanction of force is confined to its operation upon individuals only, and does not extend to the operation of force upon States.

If, therefore, States can be controlled by writs of *injunction* and *mandamus* upon their officers, it would be an illustration of the action of force upon individuals, not upon States, as, in the views of the Fathers, force can only be used against individuals, not against States.

Perhaps Messrs. Mason, Madison, Hamilton, and Ellsworth are wrong; but, as Lord Byron has said in his "English Bards and Scotch Reviewers," "Better to err with Pope than shine with Pye."

Yours truly,

ARTHUR D. CALL.

<sup>31</sup> Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, Vol. III, 1911, pp. 240-241.

## THE DEGENERATION OF BOLSHEVISM

By PROFESSOR S. A. KORFF

THE most hopeful sign of the present day in the Russian question is the rapid degeneration of Bolshevism as a system of government. The outside world knows sufficiently about the way Lenin came into power in November, 1917; there were three main reasons for his remarkable success at that time: First, the disintegration of Kerensky's administration and great discontent of the masses of the people with the existing conditions of government, which did not satisfy anybody; secondly, the energy and power of will which characterized the Bolsheviks, especially when compared to the disillusioned and disappointed ruling classes and intelligentsia, whom the Bolsheviks ousted from power; thirdly, and mainly, the fact that the Bolshevik group knew what they wanted and had a definite program, which appealed strongly to many social classes of the Russian people; in this last respect one may remember the apparent success of their cleverly chosen slogans, *land, food, and peace*. None of them came true; none of them could ever come true; the Bolshevik leaders knew that better than any one else, but that did not make any difference, as long as such promises could fool the people and bring Lenin the necessary support of the masses.

Lenin came into power bringing with him a very clearly worked out program and plan of government, and repeatedly said that he wanted to experiment on the Russian people, as to how his main ideal—i. e., Communism—would work in practice. His other principles were only the further development and adaptation of Communism as their fundamental basis. Thus the Bolsheviks proclaimed the nationalization of industry and commerce, did away with the banks, abolished land property, telling the peasants they could seize all the land they wanted, severed their relations with the western bourgeois governments, and proclaimed a merciless civil war, directed against the former ruling classes, especially the bourgeoisie, their most dangerous enemies and opponents. The latter did not want to die and naturally fought the Bolshevik Government by all sorts of means, particularly by clever "sabotage" of the administration; hence reprisals of the Bolsheviks, which soon turned into a system of bloody murder, persecutions, and abuse never surpassed by any previous régime, Tsarism included. All who were against Bolshevism were mercilessly eliminated and any resistance broken down without hesitation. That the Bolsheviks themselves were a small minority of the people never hampered them in the least; they openly stood for the reign of the minority and against the idea of majority rule as an antiquated bourgeois institution.

The Bolsheviks cleared the field of action very soon because of their great energy and lack of scruples; no more impediments seemed to exist, and yet as early as in 1918 Lenin had to confess that his experiment did not bring him the expected satisfaction and desired results. He said Russia was not ready for his system; she was too uneducated, too immature; socially and economically too loosely organized. For this reason he began to stake his hopes on a world revolution which

would bring salvation from the west and realize his ideals in other countries more civilized and better prepared for Communism. The near future will bring him, however, new disappointments when he begins to realize that the western countries will also not follow the path his program outlines for them.

Meanwhile, in Russia, Bolshevism as a system of government is rapidly degenerating. We see the signs of such a degeneration in the following facts: It appears most clearly in the absolute failure of the nationalization of land, industry, and commerce. The peasants in 1917-1918 were backing Lenin because he promised them the land they needed so very badly; but when after they had seized it, incidentally murdering the land-owners and burning their manors, the Bolsheviks told them that the land was the property of the Commune, the village, and even the State. But now their own bitter disappointment set in and the peasants, as a class, turned away from Bolshevism; in other words, Communism failed, because the peasants wanted private-land ownership at all costs.

#### Industry Breaks Down

Similar disappointments awaited the industrial factory workers, after the Russian industry had been ruthlessly nationalized. The factory workmen soon found out that they could not work without the help of educated engineers; the Bolsheviks had to bring the latter back and pay them enormous salaries never dreamed of before. But at the present day even the owners are called back in many cases, because the return of the engineers proved to be insufficient; the industry had to be provided with raw materials, with credits, capital, complicated bookkeeping, interrelations, appreciation of market needs and values, etc.; in other words, with the whole sensitive and intricate system of the old "despised bourgeois" industry. In every respect and in the slightest details do the Bolsheviks thus come back to the industrial methods of the old régime because their nationalization plan did not work in practice. The Bolshevik régime created a dull system of centralization, which is nothing else than a government syndicalism; each branch of industry (production, as well as distribution) is regulated by a central board (about sixty in all), which latter are in their turn merged into the Supreme Council of National Economy; this created a new bureaucracy and such an amount of red tape that all the shortcomings of the Tsar's régime fade in comparison. The workmen's committees have either disappeared or fizzled out and are everywhere replaced by individual managers, who run the plants and factories in the good old way. However, before this reversion has been achieved immense harm was done to the Russian industry, which in many branches is ruined to such an extent that it will take a decade before normal conditions can once more be established.

If such were the impediments for the nationalization of industry, much greater ones existed in the commercial field. Here one can say that the Bolsheviks never succeeded in establishing even a shadow of nationalization except for the closing of the banks; commerce is much too individualistic and depends entirely on private initiative. As to the banks, one must note, first, that not all banks were abolished, the Moscow Peoples Bank

having escaped for a long while, as well as the State Bank, which also worked on the old lines of business. What little commerce there is left at present, mostly barter, is conducted certainly in the usual way and not through Bolshevik methods. The same must be said about the railroads; the Bolshevik system did not work in this case either, and at present they had to abolish their soviets or committees and are running the railroads in the old bourgeois way. Krassin, the strong man of Lenin, when he undertook to be the Minister (or "Commissar") of Railways and Industry, made it the one condition of accepting office to abolish at once all the committees of railroads and industry and revert to the previous system of management; and it is just on account of this fact of going back to the old methods that he did succeed in restoring some order in his department. He did the same thing in the Ukraina at the time the Bolsheviks held those provinces; at the head of the local factories he put managers, most of whom were Germans.

#### Labor Armies

The same thing must be said about the Bolshevik Red army. The former principles of Bolshevik organization, with all its committees, have quite disappeared and are replaced by iron discipline, the Tsar's general staff, former generals and colonels, just as in the times of the "ancien régime." Perhaps there might even be found signs of fear of this new Red army among the more farsighted Bolshevik leaders, as there is no place for Socialism or Communism in such an army.

Already during the first months of Lenin's rule do we find the appearance of the most pernicious consequence of Bolshevism, namely, gradual decrease of *production*. We firmly believe that the stopping of production is the main cause of the decay of Bolshevism, and the best proof of how little a system of Communism is able to work out in practice; where there is no production there always begins a slow process of decay; the social body turns into a corpse that has to disintegrate sooner or later. The Bolsheviks themselves know this very well. Their Finance Minister, Krestinsky, for example, states that "in food production, in communications, in raw-material output, and in manufacturing industry Russia is so completely exhausted that one may say that she has nothing left except a dwindling stock of uncut forests and vast fields of minerals, which have only potential value, and the dilapidated shells of several score million dwellings." Just the same is true of the Bolsheviks about agriculture, which is also ruined. The output having declined over 50 per cent, I don't think that one can find a better proof of the utter degeneration of the economic side of Bolshevism, of which its theorists were formerly most proud.

But parallel to this decay we see that the social conditions have also developed in the same direction; instead of a millenium of Communism and general brotherhood we find a steady growth of a new bourgeoisie and aristocracy, recruited at present from two sources: On one hand there is the Bolshevik bureaucracy and hierarchy, living an easy life among the suffering population, and on the other a whole numerous class of speculators and profiteers who became immensely rich, while their brethren are starving and dying; in other words,

as Lincoln Eyre rightly says in his articles just published by the *New York World*: "Capital still accumulates in the good old way and is in no way abolished or replaced by Communism, and there is at present in Bolshevik Russia a *lesser measure of Communism* in actual practice than there existed in the belligerent European countries during the war years."

This is a shining instance of how little Bolshevism or Communism (which is one and the same thing, according to Lenin himself) can work in practice, and how they are necessarily degenerating if applied as a system of government.

Meanwhile, unfortunately, Russia is totally ruined; the two years of Bolshevism have succeeded in one way—in practically wiping out the whole former wealth of the country and in destroying the accumulations of centuries of the previous generations, who were slowly building up the Russian culture and civilization. Lenin's experiment costs Russia untold suffering, economic ruin for a whole decade at least, the moral and political downfall and the consequent danger of foreign selfish exploitation and serfdom.

#### A New Bureaucracy

The Bolshevik administration has created a vast net of bureaucratic offices all over the country, and their overwhelming majority is filled at present by the former officials of the Empire and by camouflaged bourgeois, who certainly only wait for a chance of overthrow of the government in order to go back to the old order of things. The Bolshevik Commissars, and especially the central Bolshevik Government, with Lenin at their head, are entirely cut off from the people, most carefully guarded by a complicated system of sentinels, hiding, just as the Tsar and his family had to hide in the depth of Moscow palaces, never seen by the public at large and never daring to show themselves otherwise than at specially packed meetings of Bolshevik supporters. As in many other ways this picture of the private life of Lenin's ministers resembles so very much the last decades of the reign of Nicholas II, only that everything is much more exaggerated at the present day and distorted into hideous caricatures.

Thus we can see that the Bolshevik Government has no support of the people whatever; it has no roots in the social body of the nation because it is a pure form of autocracy, developed *ad absurdum* and verging on hooliganism. If it is true, however, that Bolshevism degenerates one could easily wonder if Lenin would not be able to adapt himself to the new conditions and change his methods of government to more civilized administration. Many Americans of the radical camp are staking all their hopes on such a transformation of Bolshevism. This, unfortunately, is a sad illusion. Just as the Tsar could not have changed his way of governing the country, notwithstanding the repeated warnings that were coming to him from so many quarters, the Bolsheviks cannot change theirs, even if they wished to do it.

From the above examples, we see that in no field does Bolshevism work in practice; its basic theory is absolutely wrong and cannot be adapted to life as a whole, nor even only in part. Here, again, we can find an interesting example in the history of Russia's last Tsarist decade. Autocracy did not work at that time; it was

clear to many people that its end was near, and though there were attempts to modernize the system of government, they were all insincere, half-hearted, and thus unsuccessful. When an unlivable basic principle of government is being patched up and mended, there always comes a moment when such a system unexpectedly snaps and goes to pieces. The same happens with Bolshevism; it is being mended and remodeled in parts, because it did not work in practice; old remedies are brought forth and Tsarist methods recurred to, but all in vain. The day must unavoidably come when the whole structure will break down and the backbone of Bolshevism will suddenly snap. Life is mercilessly undermining its very foundations.

This gives us the absolute assurance that sooner or later (and probably sooner than later) Bolshevism has to collapse; one fine day the Bolshevik Government will fall, just as suddenly as the Tsarist Government did, and will have to be replaced by a democratic government, which will mind the will of the people and will represent the nation at large.

It is the unavoidable doom of all autocracies, ever was so and always will remain so; they perish because their power is built only on force and outward coercion. The day invariably comes when force no more helps, and as no democratic support of the people is then forthcoming the autocratic government has necessarily to collapse; and before the final collapse there always exists a slow but terrible process of decay and degeneration, costing the people indescribable suffering as long as the dying régime still hopelessly clings to power. It is just that sad period of degeneration of the Bolshevik régime that Russia is living through at present.

Let us hope that it is the last stage of her misery and that the day of her salvation is not far off.

As to the Allies' Russian policy, I think R. C. Long put it in a nutshell, when he wrote:

"America and the Allies have blundered. They might have recognized Bolshevism as a permanent evil and tried to make the best of it, or they might have resolutely overthrown Bolshevism and established a civilized government, which would have proved their friend. Instead they chose to irritate the Bolsheviks without weakening them and to disappoint and disillusion all anti-Bolsheviks. Every one informed in Russian affairs knows that this is so. The most anti-Bolshevik newspaper in the Russian language reported with perfect truth that the attitude of Russia is viciously against the Allies and indifferent toward Germany."

We believe that most Russians will corroborate this frightfully pessimistic statement. The situation is full of dangers for the future.

## THE GOSPEL OF GOOD-WILL

By OSWALD F. SCHUETTE

PEACE cannot live in the world today. It makes no difference what covenants are made or what treaties are ratified or rejected. In a world filled with hatred there can be only a truce. The armistice may last for years, but it will end in war.

You cannot cook without heat. A Kansas legislature cannot stop cyclones with resolutions. Even Luther